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Publications

Category: Evolution of Communication

Honest signaling made simple

Jacob Chisausky, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

Communication, Game Theory, Evolution

Signals without teleology

Carl T. Bergstrom, Simon Huttegger, and et al.

Communication, Game theory, Philosophy

Honest signaling with costly gambles

Frazer Meacham, Aaron Perlmutter, et al.

Communication, Evolution, , Game Theory

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Dealing with Deception in Biology

Carl T. Bergstrom

Evolution, Communication

The evolution of functionally referential meaning in a structured world

Matina C. Donaldson, Michael Lachmann, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Philosophy

The disadvantage of combinatatorial communication

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Shannon Information and Biological Fitness

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Communication, Evolution

Separating equilibria in continuous signaling games

Carl T. Bergstrom, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

Michael Lachmann, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Alarm calls as costly signals of antipredator vigilance: the watchful babbler game

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Signalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Evolution, Communication

Signalling Among Relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

Evolution, Communication

Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly?

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

Evolution, Communication