Partial honesty in a hummingbird polymorphism provides evidence for a hybrid equilibrium
J. J. Falk, C. T. Bergstrom, et al.
Honest signaling made simple
Jacob Chisausky, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.
Signals without teleology
Carl T. Bergstrom, Simon Huttegger, and et al.
Honest signaling with costly gambles
Frazer Meacham, Aaron Perlmutter, et al.
Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication
Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.
The evolution of functionally referential meaning in a structured world
Matina C. Donaldson, Michael Lachmann, et al.
The disadvantage of combinatatorial communication
Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom
Shannon Information and Biological Fitness
Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann
Separating equilibria in continuous signaling games
Carl T. Bergstrom, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.
Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language
Michael Lachmann, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.
Alarm calls as costly signals of antipredator vigilance: the watchful babbler game
Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann
Signalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap
Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann
Signalling Among Relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel
Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom
Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly?
Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann