Carl T. Bergstrom, Publications

Partial honesty in a hummingbird polymorphism provides evidence for a hybrid equilibrium

J. J. Falk, C. T. Bergstrom, et al.

2025 Animal Behaviour

Communication, Game Theory, Evolution

Feelings and flirtations foster long-term cooperation

Carl T. Bergstrom and Graeme Ruxton

2024 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA

Game Theory

Honest signaling made simple

Jacob Chisausky, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

2023 EcoEvoRxiv

Communication, Game Theory, Evolution

The cost of information acquisition by natural selection

Ryan S. McGee, Olivia Kosterlitz, et al.

2022 bioRxiv

Evolution, Information theory, Game Theory

Signals without teleology

Carl T. Bergstrom, Simon Huttegger, and et al.

2020 Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science C

Communication, Game theory, Philosophy

Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality

Carl T. Bergstrom, Jacob G. Foster, and Yangbo Song

2016 arXiv:1605.05822

Science of Science, Economics Game Theory, Philosophy

Contest models highlight inherent inefficiencies of scientific funding competitions

Kevin Gross and Carl T. Bergstrom

2019 PLOS Biology

Science of Science, Economics, Game Theory

Microbiology: Taking the bad with the good

Carl T. Bergstrom and Benjamin Kerr

2015 Nature
Supplementary material

Evolutionary Medicine, Game Theory

Honest signaling with costly gambles

Frazer Meacham, Aaron Perlmutter, et al.

2014 Royal Society Interface

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

2013 Proc. R. Soc. London B

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Choosing Partners: A Classroom Experiment

Carl T. Bergstrom, Theodore C. Bergstrom, et al.

2013Journal of Economics Education

Economics, Game Theory

Building Trust by Wasting Time

Carl T. Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Michael Lachmann

2008 Ch. 7 in Paul Zak, ed. Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy

Game Theory, Economics

The disadvantage of combinatatorial communication

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

2004 Proc. R. Soc. London B

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

2003 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA

Evolution, Game Theory

Evolutionary Rates and the Division of Surpluses in Mutualisms

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

2003 Ch. 12 in Peter Hammerstein, ed. Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. pp.223-238

Evolution, Game Theory

Separating equilibria in continuous signaling games

Carl T. Bergstrom, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

2002 Philisophical Transactions of the Royal Society B

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

Michael Lachmann, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

2001 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Alarm calls as costly signals of antipredator vigilance: the watchful babbler game

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

2001 Animal Behaviour

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Toward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching

Carl T. Bergstrom and Leslie Real

2000 Evolutionary Ecology Research

Evolution, Game Theory, Economics

Pure versus mixed strategists: the evolution of behavioral heterogeneity in individuals and populations

Carl T. Bergstrom and Peter Godfrey-Smith

1998 Biology and Philosophy

Evolution, Game theory, Philosophy

Signalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

1998 Genetics

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

1998 Theoretical Population Biology

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly?

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

1997 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Publications

Partial honesty in a hummingbird polymorphism provides evidence for a hybrid equilibrium

Feelings and flirtations foster long-term cooperation

Honest signaling made simple

The cost of information acquisition by natural selection

Signals without teleology

Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality

Contest models highlight inherent inefficiencies of scientific funding competitions

Microbiology: Taking the bad with the good

Honest signaling with costly gambles

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Choosing Partners: A Classroom Experiment

Building Trust by Wasting Time

The disadvantage of combinatatorial communication

The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race

Evolutionary Rates and the Division of Surpluses in Mutualisms

Separating equilibria in continuous signaling games

Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

Alarm calls as costly signals of antipredator vigilance: the watchful babbler game

Toward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching

Pure versus mixed strategists: the evolution of behavioral heterogeneity in individuals and populations

Signalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap

Signalling Among Relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel

Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly?

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