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Publications

Category: Game Theory

Signals without teleology

Carl T. Bergstrom, Simon Huttegger, and et al.

  • 2020 Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science C

Communication, Game theory

Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality

Carl T. Bergstrom, Jacob G. Foster, and Yangbo Song

  • 2016 arXiv:1605.05822

Science of Science, Economics, Game Theory

Contest models highlight inherent inefficiencies of scientific funding competitions

Kevin Gross and Carl T. Bergstrom

  • 2019 PLOS Biology

Science of Science, Economics, Game Theory

Microbiology: Taking the bad with the good

Carl T. Bergstrom and Benjamin Kerr

Evolutionary Medicine, Game Theory

Honest signaling with costly gambles

Frazer Meacham, Aaron Perlmutter, et al.

  • 2014 Royal Society Interface

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom, et al.

  • 2013 Proc. R. Soc. London B

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Choosing Partners: A Classroom Experiment

Carl T. Bergstrom, Theodore C. Bergstrom, et al.

  • 2013Journal of Economics Education

Economics, Game Theory

Building Trust by Wasting Time

Carl T. Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Michael Lachmann

  • 2008 Ch. 7 in Paul Zak, ed. Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy

Game Theory, Economics

The disadvantage of combinatatorial communication

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

  • 2004 Proc. R. Soc. London B

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

  • 2003 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA

Evolution, Game Theory

Evolutionary Rates and the Division of Surpluses in Mutualisms

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

  • 2003 Ch. 12 in Peter Hammerstein, ed. Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. pp.223-238

Evolution, Game Theory

Separating equilibria in continuous signaling games

Carl T. Bergstrom, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

  • 2002 Philisophical Transactions of the Royal Society B

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

Michael Lachmann, Szabolcs Számadó, et al.

  • 2001 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Alarm calls as costly signals of antipredator vigilance: the watchful babbler game

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

  • 2001 Animal Behaviour

Communication, Evolution, Game Theory

Toward a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching

Carl T. Bergstrom and Leslie Real

  • 2000 Evolutionary Ecology Research

Evolution, Game Theory, Economics

Pure versus mixed strategists: the evolution of behavioral heterogeneity in individuals and populations

Carl T. Bergstrom and Peter Godfrey-Smith

  • 1998 Biology and Philosophy

Evolution, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. III. Talk is cheap

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

  • 1998 Genetics

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. II. Beyond the Tower of Babel

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom

  • 1998 Theoretical Population Biology

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

Signalling Among Relatives. I. When is signalling too costly?

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann

  • 1997 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B

Evolution, Communication, Game theory

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